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A SINKING SHIP: EPA REGULATION OF THE NAVY 
TRAINING PROGRAM SINKEX UNDER THE OCEAN 
DUMPING ACT AND THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
CONTROL ACT 
Laura Zippel 
ABSTRACT: The EPA currently regulates the Navy program Sink Exercise 
(SINKEX) under a permit issued under the Ocean Dumping Act. The Navy 
regards SINKEX as both a “live fire exercise,” important for the training of 
sailors in tactics and operations, and as a ship disposal program. Due to the toxic 
materials used to construct the derelict ships–including PCBs, asbestos, and 
lead–a case was filed in San Francisco District Court alleging that the EPA is 
required to regulate and permit SINKEX under the Toxic Substances Control 
Act (TSCA). This comment addresses the complexities arising from EPA 
permitting of SINKEX, including a comparison of the Ocean Dumping Act with 
the TSCA, military waivers and exemptions present in both statutes, and a 
discussion of possible interagency cooperation and enforcement measures this 
may implicate. This comment concludes that the most effective method for 
disposing of derelict ships while maintaining environmental and human health 
as well as national security is legislative reform and an increased budget for 
disposal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Navy has a ship problem—a problem of old, 
derelict ships constructed with hazardous materials such as 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), asbestos, and lead.1 The 
Navy also has a disposal problem. Many of these ships are 
floating in inner harbors leaching chemicals into waters close 
to shore, presenting a health hazard to nearby communities.2 
One way the Navy disposes of these ships is to use them as 
target practice in a program called Sink Exercise (SINKEX).3 
In this program, the Navy tows the derelict ships out to the 
ocean and sinks them in “live fire exercises.”4 The Navy 
primarily classifies the program as a live training program 
that helps not only tactical and operation training but also 
“weapons effect testing” and future ship construction.5 
Therefore, the program can be regarded as important to the 
protection of national security as well as a means of ship 
disposal.6 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the 
Navy’s activities during SINKEX through a general permit 
issued under the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries 
Act, also known as the Ocean Dumping Act.7 When originally 
1. See Letter from Robert H. Wayland III, Dir., Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and 
Watersheds, to Elsie L. Munsell, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of the Navy, Env’t and Safety 
(Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Wayland Letter] available at http://water.epa.gov/ 
type/oceb/oceandumping/dredgedmaterial/upload/2008_04_07_oceans_regulatory_dum
pdredged_1999EPA_navyagreement.pdf; Takako Morita, N.I.M.B.Y. Syndrome and the 
Ticking Time Bomb: Disputes Over the Dismantling of Naval Obsolete Vessels, 17 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 723, 724 (2005). 
2. Id. 
3. SEA 21 Navy Inactive Ship Program: SINKEX, http://www.navsea.navy.mil/ 




6. The navy describes the objective of the program as “[s]upporting fleet readiness 
and training of the active duty Navy personnel by providing environmentally clean 
target ships for at-sea live-fire exercises.” Id. 
7. 40 C.F.R. § 229.2 (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 1411 (2012). 
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enacted, the Ocean Dumping Act replaced common law and 
state actions, becoming the main statute regulating the 
dumping and transport of materials in and through the U.S. 
coastal and territorial waters making it the legislative 
structure for EPA regulation of SINKEX.8 Due to the toxic 
materials used in the construction of the derelict Navy ships – 
such as PCBs, asbestos, and lead – the EPA could also 
arguably be required to regulate the program under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA).9 The TSCA deals primarily 
with the regulation of toxic materials in all stages of the 
manufacture of goods, including their disposal.10 Regardless of 
Navy objectives, SINKEX is a disposal operation as well as a 
training operation, making the TSCA a relevant regulatory 
framework.11 
The marine pollution caused by SINKEX brings to the 
surface a common clash between often conflicting public goods, 
the protection of the environment, human health, and the 
United States’ national security.12 Although both wish to 
promote the public good, the EPA and the Navy have 
fundamentally different primary missions and differ in their 
understanding of the SINKEX program.13  
8. William H. Rodgers Jr., Rodgers’ Environmental Law: Air and Water, 2 ENVTL. L. 
(West) § 4:34 (2012); see also Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammer’s 
Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 21 (1981). See 40 C.F.R. § 229.2 (2012) for the EPA’s general permit 
to the Navy. For EPA reasoning for using the Ocean Dumping Act see Letter from 
James J. Jones, Acting Assistant Admin’r, EPA Office of Chemical Safety and 
Pollution Prevention, to Jim Puckett, Exec. Dir., Basel Action Network, David A. Scott, 
Vice President, Sierra Club, Emily Jeffers Staff Attorney, Oceans Program, Center for 
Biological Diversity (July 10, 2012) [hereinafter Jones Letter] available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/chemtest/pubs/FINAL_Letter_to_Petitioners_2012-07-10.pdf. 
9. US NAVY DUMPING PROGRAM: PETITION TO EPA TO PROTECT HUMAN HEALTH AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT FROM UNREASONABLE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NAVY’S SINKING 
EXERCISE PROGRAM (SINKEX) (2012), http://www.epa.gov/oppt/chemtest/pubs/ 
Petition_April_2012-SINKEX.pdf [hereinafter PETITION TO EPA]; 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) 
(2012). 
10. SEA 21, supra note 3; 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (2012); David Markell, An Overview of 
TSCA, Its History and Key Underlying Assumptions, and its Place in Environmental 
Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 333 (2010). 
11. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (2012). 
12. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (NEPA and 
Marine Mammal Protection Act challenge to Navy training with Sonar off the coast of 
California); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (The Court refused to 
enjoin the Navy’s bombing common fishing grounds off the coast of Puerto Rico under 
Clean Water Act and instead held that a waiver would promote but not ensure 
compliance). 
13. See Jones Letter, supra note 8; Wayland Letter, supra note 1; SEA 21, supra 
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The EPA’s purpose in regulating SINKEX is the protection 
of human health and the environment.14 Therefore, the EPA is 
concerned less with the actual nature of the training exercise 
than with the towing and disposal of the ships in the ocean.15 
In contrast, the Navy’s goal with the program is to promote the 
readiness of its fleet through training, weapons development, 
and ship design.16 Therefore, the Navy is less concerned, at 
least in their core purposes, with the disposal of the ships and 
the environmental hazard they pose.17 The clash between what 
each agency views as a public good is important because it 
highlights deficiencies in our statutory, regulatory, and 
judicial frameworks in addressing inter-agency conflicts of 
interest. 
This comment will explore how the EPA is caught between 
complying with statutory requirements under the Ocean 
Dumping Act and the TSCA, as well as the limitations on its 
enforcement mission caused by the Navy’s national defense 
mission. Part I of this comment details the history and impact 
of both SINKEX and PCBs domestically. Part II outlines the 
relevant part of both the Ocean Dumping Act and the TSCA. It 
also explores the potential use of military waivers present in 
both Acts and argues that they should not apply in the context 
of SINKEX. Part III argues that the EPA, even if able to 
permit the Navy under the TSCA, needs political backing in 
able to enforce a stricter permit on the Navy unless a citizen 
suit forces Navy compliance. Part IV highlights how difficult it 
is to ensure—without higher level political cooperation—the 
inter-agency cooperation that will benefit both the public good 
of national security and the public good of environmental and 
human health. 
note 3. 
14. See Our Mission and What We Do, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-
and-what-we-do (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
15. See Jones Letter, supra note 8. 
16. SEA 21, supra note 3; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MARITIME 
ADMINISTRATION, SINKEX DISPOSAL PROGRAM, http://www.marad.dot.gov/ 
ships_shipping_landing_page/ship_disposal_program/sinkex/SINKEX_PROGRAM.htm 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2013) [hereinafter SINKEX DISPOSAL]. 
17. The Navy is aware of the environmental concerns, see, e.g., the Navy description 
of SINKEK as “[s]upporting fleet readiness and training of the active duty Navy 
personnel by providing environmentally clean target ships for at-sea live-fire exercises” 
(emphasis added), SEA 21, supra note 3; SINKEX DISPOSAL, supra note 16; Wayland 
Letter, supra note 1. 
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A. The History and Impact of SINKEX 
After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Cold War ended, 
the Navy, faced with decreased need and budget reductions, 
moved from aggressively building ships to downsizing.18 Prior 
to 1989, the Navy disposed of the retired ships using SINKEX 
without official knowledge of the presence of PCBs onboard the 
sunken ships.19 SINKEX drills typically occurred in water 
greater than 3000 meters, but there were occasional incidents 
where the ships sank in as little as 600-1000 meters.20 
In 1989, the Navy voluntarily suspended SINKEX due to the 
discovery of PCBs onboard the ships.21 At the time, the Navy 
and the EPA had no concrete studies on the effects of the PCBs 
and the rate at which the PCBs were contaminating the 
surrounding waters.22 In the 1990s, the Navy turned to other 
sources for dismantling the ships, including domestic 
scrapping programs and international scrapping programs in 
India and Bangladesh.23 International scrapping proved 
problematic after the EPA created regulations restricting the 
condition of the ships before they could be towed 
internationally for fear of the ships leaking toxins and oil into 
the ocean.24 Meanwhile, domestic scrapping programs were 
expensive and of limited availability.25 The U.S. ship 
dismantling industry was hampered by workplace and 
environmental regulations due to the hazardous waste in the 
ships.26 Thus, the Navy was left with fleets of ships posing 
environmental risks that it did not have the budget or means 
to scrap.27 
SINKEX was reinstated in part to dispose of the ships in 
18. Jeffrey Paul Luster, The Domestic And International Legal Implications Of 
Exporting Hazardous Waste: Exporting Naval Vessels For Scrapping, 7 ENVTL. LAW. 
75, 75 (2000); STEPHEN DYCUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 4 (1996). 
19. RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL RELEASE OF PCBS AND OTHER 
CONTAMINANTS FROM SUNKEN NAVY SHIPS IN THE DEEP OCEAN: EX-AGERHOLM CASE 
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what the Navy deemed a cost effective and useful manner.28 
The Navy and the EPA came to an agreement in which the 
Navy was exempted from regulation under the TSCA and 
issued a permit under the Ocean Dumping Act so long as the 
Navy agreed to strip the ships of all liquid PCBs and oil before 
sinking them.29 The Navy then reinstated SINKEX under a 
general permit, codifying the agreement promulgated by the 
EPA.30 To date, with 117 ships sunk, there is no evidence that 
the Navy has violated the general permit, although there 
continues to be questions regarding the accuracy of Navy 
reporting of the true hazards associated with the program.31 
In 2011, the Chief of Naval Operations announced that the 
Navy would sink three inactive warships towed from 
California to waters off Hawaii as part of the Rim of the Pacific 
war games in the summer of 2012, increasing the number of 
ships sunk since 1999 to 117.32 In response, the Basel Action 
Network, the Center for Biological Diversity, and Earthjustice 
filed a petition against the EPA to compel rulemaking under 
the TSCA.33 When the EPA rejected the petition, the 
petitioners filed suit in federal district court in San Francisco, 
alleging that the EPA was violating the TSCA with their 
dismissal of the petition.34 This case, for the first time, shifted 
the focus from the Ocean Dumping Act to the TSCA in regards 
to programs like SINKEX.35 Traditionally, the Ocean Dumping 
28. EX-AGERHOLM CASE STUDY, supra note 19, at 1-1. 
29. See Id. at 1-2; Wayland Letter, supra note 1. 
30. See 40 C.F.R. § 229.2 (2012); SEA 21, supra note 3; SINKEX DISPOSAL, supra 
note 16; Wayland Letter, supra note 1. 
31. See 40 C.F.R. § 229.2 (2012); Navy “Sinkex” Raises Pollution Fears, Fox NEWS 
ONLINE (March 3, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/03/03/navy-sinkex-raises-
pollution-fear/. 
32. See Navy's 'Great Green Fleet' Will Pollute Ocean With PCBs, Other Toxins in 
Ship-sinking War Games: Suit and Petition Filed to Challenge Ship Sinkings, CENTER 
FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (June 28, 2012), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/ 
press_releases/2012/sinkex-06-28-2012.html; In the Pacific, New Interest in War 
Games, U-T SAN DIEGO (July 17, 2012), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/ 
2012/jul/17/international-navy-war-games/ (July 17, 2012); U.S. Government Ends the 
Sinking of Old Ships as Artificial Reefs: Green Groups Claim Victory, Call to End 
SINKEX, BAN MEDIA RELEASE (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.ban.org/2012/09/06/ 
u-s-government-ends-the-sinking-of-old-shipsas-artificial-reefs/. 
33. PETITION TO EPA, supra note 9. 
34. Basel Action Network v. EPA, (No. CV 11 6185), 2011 WL 6401178. 
35. Id. 
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Act was the primary statute regulating disposal at sea.36 This 
case raises the unique argument that other statutes, such as 
the TSCA, may provide additional safeguards for ocean 
dumping that are more restrictive than the often-amended 
Ocean Dumping Act.37 
B. The History and Impact of PCBs on the Marine 
Environment and Human Health 
PCBs are synthetically manufactured chemicals that belong 
to the chlorinated hydrocarbon family of chemicals.38 They 
have a high boiling point, are chemically stabile, and have low 
electrical conductivity.39 These qualities made them widely 
used in a variety of manufactured goods including electrical 
equipment, hydraulic equipment, paints, plastics, and even 
copy paper.40 PCBs were domestically manufactured in the 
U.S. from 1929 until their manufacture was prohibited under 
the TSCA in 1979.41 PCBs do not dissolve or break down 
easily, allowing them to be carried long distances and cycle 
between air, water, and soil.42 The more heavily chlorinated 
the PCBs are, the longer they persist in the environment.43 
Additionally, PCBs rarely dissolve in the ocean, have a 
tendency to absorb sediments and organic particulate matter, 
36. “The MPRSA has had more influence on restricting ocean dumping practices 
than any other statute; thus it deserves considerable attention.” Steven V. Moore, 
Troubles in the High Seas: A New Era in the Regulation of U.S. Ocean Dumping, 22 
ENVTL. L. 913, 928 (1992). 
37. Id. 
38. JON DODRILL, KEITH MILLE, AND BILL HORN, FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE 
CONSERVATION COMMISSION, FLORIDA ARTIFICIAL REEF PROGRAM, DIVISION OF 
MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, PROGRESS REPORT SUMMARIZING THE REEF FISH 
SAMPLING, PCB ANALYSIS RESULTS, AND VISUAL MONITORING ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
ORISKANY REEF, A DECOMMISSIONED FORMER NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIER SUNK IN 2006 AS 
AN ARTIFICIAL REEF IN THE NORTHEASTERN GULF OF MEXICO OFF PENSACOLA, FLORIDA 
10 (April 13, 2011), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/Oriskany-
Reef-PCB-Monitoring.pdf. [hereinafter MONITORING REPORT]. 
39. Marc W. Trost, USAF, The regulation of Polychlorinated Biphenyls Under the 
Toxic Substances Control Act, 31 A.F. L. REV. 117, 118 (1989); Basic Information: 
Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB), EPA WEBSITE, http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/ 
hazard/tsd/pcbs/pubs/about.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
40. Trost, supra note 39, at 118; Basic Information: Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB), 
supra note 39. 
41. Basic Information: Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB), supra note 39. 
42. Id. 
43. MONITORING REPORT, supra note 38, at 11. 
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and can accumulate in lipid-rich fatty tissues of organisms, 
making them transferable up the marine food chain.44 The 
EPA notes that PCBs “can be carried long distances and have 
been found in snow and sea water in areas far away from 
where they were released into the environment.”45 Scientific 
studies have shown that PCBs are harmful to humans even at 
low levels.46 Exposure to PCBs has been linked to a wide range 
of adverse health problems including cancer, birth defects, 
disfiguring skin conditions, eye disorders, and reproductive 
failure.47 In addition to negative impacts on human health, 
PCBs negatively impact aquatic life.48 Studies show that PCBs 
can impair reproductive function and survival rates in 
organisms from unicellular phytoplankton to fish, birds and 
larger mammals.49 Because PCBs easily enter the environment 
and are transferred great distances, the introduction of large 
quantities of them through SINKEX to the marine 
environment is problematic both to human health and marine 
environmental health. 
PCBs in the Navy ships used in the SINKEX program are 
primarily found in insulation materials such as fiberglass, felt, 
foam, and cork.50 Other sources of PCBs include paint, 
electrical insulation, hydraulic systems, motor systems, 
transformers and capacitors, caulking materials, and other 
adhesives such as tape and plastics.51 Since some of these 
materials are part of the structural stability of the ships, the 
Navy is unable to strip all the PCBs before towing the ships 
out to sea for sinking.52 As stated above, PCBs do not readily 
break down in a natural environment and can travel great 
distances through water and air.53  
44. Id. 
45. Basic Information: Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB), supra note 39. 
46. MONITORING REPORT, supra note 38, at 12. 
47. Additionally these affects are not limited to sensitive populations but can affect 
anyone exposed. Trost, supra note 39, at 118; Health Effects of PCBs, EPA WEBSITE, 
http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard/tsd/pcbs/pubs/effects.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 
2013). 
48. MONITORING REPORT, supra note 38, at 12; Trost, supra note 39, at 118. 
49. Trost, supra note 39, at 118. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. MONITORING REPORT, supra note 38, at 15. 
53. Basic Information: Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB), supra note 39. 
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By sinking these ships, which can cause the PCBs to leach 
into the marine environment, there is a possibility that the 
Navy is increasing the PCBs found in the fish eaten all over 
the United States. PCBs can travel through marine 
environments by systems such as upwelling54, biographic 
transport55, and meridional circulation.56 Once spread out, 
they are often stored in the fatty tissues of fish commonly 
consumed by humans, such as snapper.57 By sinking these 
ships, the Navy is increasing the PCB exposure in the United 
States, potentially harming not only the marine environment 
but also the human populations the Navy is safeguarding 
militarily. 
In 2011, a report was compiled in Florida that showed just 
how fast and in what quantities PCBs could leach into the 
surrounding marine environment from the sunken ships.58 In a 
program similar to SINKEX the Navy began to sink ships for 
artificial reef development (REEFEX).59 Before the Navy was 
allowed to sink ships for REEFEX programs, the EPA, acting 
under statutory requirements of the TSCA, required a finding 
of “no unreasonable risk of injury to human health and the 
environment.”60 In order to determine if sinking a ship close to 
54. Upwelling occurs when winds blow perpendicular to the coastline pushing 
surface water away from the shoreline to be replaced by cold, nutrient rich water from 
deeper layers of the Ocean. This is particularly notable on the west coast of the U.S 
where the coastline is oriented North-South. Dr. Steve Gaines, Dr. Satie Airame, 
Upwelling, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, 
http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/explorations/02quest/background/upwelling/upwelling.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
55. Biographic Transport occurs through the food chain where smaller organisms are 
eaten by larger ones. The larger organisms thus accumulate toxins in their fat stores 
making them dangerous for human consumption. In addition, the types of PCBs that 
accumulate in fish tissues are the PCB mixtures most potentially carcinogenic to 
humans. MONITORING REPORT, supra note 38, at 12. 
56. Meridional circulation is a particular type of atmospheric circulation that 
consists of the vertical and north or south components of atmospheric motion. 
Atmospheric circulation describes the system of atmospheric motion that occurs over 
the Earth. Meteorology Glossary, AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY, 
http://glossary.ametsoc.org/wiki/Meridional_flow (last visited Nov. 23, 2013); Glossary, 
Artic Climatology and Meteorology, NATIONAL SNOW & ICE DATA CENTER, http:// 
nsidc.org/cgi-bin/words/glossary.pl?keyword=atmospheric+circulation (last visited Nov. 
23, 2013). 
57. MONITORING REPORT, supra note 38, at 12. 
58. Id. 
59. SINKEX DISPOSAL, supra note 16. 
60. MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT OFFICE SPAWAR SYSTEMS CENTER, EX-
ORISKANY ARTIFICIAL REEF PROJECT ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 2-1 (January 
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shore for REEFEX would harm human health or the 
environment, the Navy completed an ecological risk 
assessment and a human health risk assessment on previously 
sunk ships which were used to create a risk assessment model 
showing the potential release of PCBs from future artificial 
reefs made from Navy ships.61 
In 2006, the Navy conducted an environmental assessment 
prior to sinking the ex-ORINSKANY off the coast of Florida for 
the REEFEX program.62 The assessment stated that although 
the ship still contained anywhere from 327.79 kilograms (kg) 
to 608.85 kg (134.3 lbs to 722.7 lbs) of PCBs on board, as well 
as numerous other toxins, the toxins would have a negligible 
impact on the surrounding marine environment.63 The EPA 
mandated the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation 
Commission (FWC) to monitor the ex-ORINSKANY for signs 
that the toxins (specifically PCBs) were leaching into the 
marine environment.64 In 2008, the FWC reported that toxins 
were entering the marine environment and creating unsafe 
human consumption levels of PCBs in fish.65 In response to the 
report, the U.S. Maritime Administration (MRAD) effectively 
ended artificial reefing projects.66 SINKEX, however, continues  
 
to operate and deposit large amounts of PCBs into the marine 
environment.67 
II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CONTROL OVER 
SINKEX 
Two statues potentially apply to SINKEX—the Ocean 
Dumping Act and the TSCA.68 The Ocean Dumping Act has 
been, and continues to be, the primary statutory authority the 
2006) available at http://meso.spawar.navy.mil/Projects/REEFEX/Reports/ 
ERA_FINAL_JANUARY_2006.pdf [hereinafter EX-ORISKANY RISK ASSESSMENT]. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. at 1-1, 1-3. 
64. MONITORING REPORT, supra note 38, at 9. 
65. See id. at 13; PETITION TO EPA, supra note 9, at 12. 
66. See U.S. Government Ends the Sinking of Old Ships as Artificial Reefs: Green 
Groups Claim Victory, Call to End SINKEX, supra note 32. 
67. Id. 
68. PETITION TO EPA, supra note 9, at 22. 
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EPA uses to regulate the transportation and dumping of 
material at sea.69 The TSCA has primarily been used by the 
EPA to regulate PCBs and other toxins ashore.70 Compared to 
the Ocean Dumping Act, the TSCA has stricter requirements 
as to the disposal of PCBs and if applied could require the EPA 
to reduce the amount of PCBs on the ships while sunk through 
programs like SINKEX. 
A. Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act (Ocean 
Dumping Act): The Primary Statutory Control Over Ocean 
Dumping 
The Ocean Dumping Act was passed in 1972 and sought to 
reduce industrial and municipal waste dumping in connection 
with the Clean Water Act.71 It contains three titles: the first 
concerns the transportation of material and the dumping of 
that material into the ocean; the second provides for research 
programs; and the third calls for the Secretary of Commerce to 
create ocean sanctuaries to preserve and restore marine 
areas.72 When passed, the Ocean Dumping Act displaced both 
federal common law—such as nuisance actions—and various 
state claims, primarily statutes pertaining to the dumping and 
transport of materials off the U.S. coastline and in territorial 
waters.73 
The EPA has considerable discretion under the Ocean 
Dumping Act when making permit decisions. The EPA’s 
discretion extends to various forms of ocean dumping except 
for “radiological, chemical, and biological warfare agents, high-
level radioactive waste, and medical waste,” which have 
stricter requirements under the statute.74 When making 
permit decisions, the EPA is required to consider the need for 
the proposed dumping, the effect of the dumping on human 
health and the environment, the effect on fisheries resources, 
the effect on marine ecosystems, the permanence of the effects 
69. See Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammer’s Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 21 
(1981); Rodgers, supra note 8, at § 4:34. 
70. David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, Its History and Key Underlying 
Assumptions, and its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 333 
(2010). 
71. Rodgers, supra note 8, at § 4:34. 
72. Id. 
73. See Middlesex, 453 U.S.at 21; Rodgers, supra note 8, at § 4:34. 
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1412 (2012). 
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of the dumping, the volume and concentration of the material 
being dumped, the appropriateness of dumping and 
alternatives including land based alternatives, and the 
dumping’s effects on other uses for the ocean such as resource 
exploitation and research.75 As part of these considerations, 
the EPA promulgated regulations defining materials that 
would be given permits based on the environmental impact.76 
Permits which do not meet the environmental criteria set forth 
in the EPA’s own regulations will be denied with no discretion 
given to the EPA Administrator.77 However, the environmental 
criteria leaves the agency with considerable discretion, stating 
that there need be no “unacceptable adverse effects” on human 
health, marine resources, marine ecosystem, or other uses of 
the ocean.78 
The EPA’s broad discretion was confirmed in National 
Wildlife Federation v. Costle,79 a case challenging the EPA’s 
less stringent environmental standards for the dumping of 
dredged material compared with nondredged material. The 
court stated, “[t]he [Ocean Dumping] Act gives unqualifiedly 
broad authority to the Administrator to weigh and consider the 
evaluation factors” and there is no indication that “Congress 
intended to limit the Administrator’s discretion.”80 Although 
this decision is based on the EPA’s ability to define its own 
criteria under the Act, it also suggests that the EPA’s 
interpretation of its criteria would be respected in light of its 
expertise.81 
In National Wildlife Foundation, the Court focused on the 
agency’s expertise in the area of ocean pollution as well as 
Congress’s intent to give the EPA broad discretion. The 
Supreme Court in 1984 confirmed that federal courts should 
defer to agency expertise in Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council.82 After Chevron, the Supreme Court 
75. Id. 
76. 40 C.F.R. § 227.4 (2013). 
77. Id. § 227.3 (2013). 
78. Id. § 227.4 (2013). 
79. 629 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
80. Id. at 132. 
81. But see City of New York v. EPA, 543 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (EPA must 
consider alternatives when giving out dumping permits under their own regulations). 
82. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a discussion of the reasoning behind Chevron deference 
to agency interpretation of statutes see Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 
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continued to support broad discretion to agency interpretation 
of statutes as well as the agency’s own regulations.83 In Auer v. 
Robbins, the Court affirmed that agency interpretation of its 
own regulations should be given deference: “Because the 
salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary’s own 
regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, 
controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.’”84 Therefore, although National Wildlife 
Foundation was decided before Chevron and Auer, it is in line 
with the direction the Supreme Court has been trending, 
suggesting that the EPA will be given broad discretion in 
applying the Ocean Dumping Act’s environmental criteria so 
long as it is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”85 
B. The Toxic Substances Control Act’s Stricter Limits on PCB 
Disposal 
Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) in 
1976 to address the dangers toxins pose both to both human 
health and the environment.86 Upon passage, the TSCA 
became part of the federal patchwork of statutory and 
regulatory authority—including the Clean Air Act, Clean 
Water Act, and Occupational Safety and Health Act—aimed to 
address environmental concerns.87 The TSCA has a broad 
scope both because of the definitions of chemical substances in 
the Act as well as the long reach of the statute from the 
manufacture to the disposal of materials.88 The TSCA’s wide-
range coverage of chemical substances makes it a versatile 
statute for the EPA, making it applicable to programs like 
SINKEX that might already be permitted under other 
B.U.L. REV. 1271 (2008). For an overview of how Chevron Deference has been used in 
EPA cases see Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Construction and Application of “Chevron 
Deference” to Administrative Action by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. FED.2D 
25 § 44-47 (Originally published in 2005).  
83. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Coeur Alaska v. Se. Alaska 
Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009). 
84. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 
U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
85. Id. 
86. Markell, supra note 70. 
87. Id. at 337. 
88. Id. at 351. 
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statutes.89 
The TSCA was specifically designed out of the need to 
protect human health, leading Congress to delegate powers to 
the EPA to prevent harmful chemicals from not just being 
released into the environment, but also from being created in 
the first place.90 Under the TSCA, the EPA established a 
registry of all chemicals processed or manufactured in the U.S. 
and was delegated the authority to ban or restrict a chemical’s 
manufacture, use, transport, and disposal.91 Any new chemical 
substance must first be approved by the EPA.92 The 
manufacturer of the chemical bears the burden of proof to 
prove that the chemical is safe and to defend any potential 
risk.93 The Act therefore sets up strict standards governing the 
manufacture, use, and disposal of all chemicals in the U.S. 
making it an extremely powerful statutory tool in the 
regulation of toxic substances, such as those on the Navy 
ships. 
The TSCA not only gives broad powers to the EPA; it also 
has specific sections and statutory mandates focusing on 
particularly harmful chemicals.94 In particular, PCBs are a 
focus of the statute.95 Under §2605(e), by 1977 the EPA was 
required to ban the “manufacture, process, or distribute in 
commerce or use any polychlorinated biphenyl in any manner 
other than in a totally enclosed manner.”96 The only exception 
to this provision is if the EPA determines that a particular use 
“will not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or 
the environment.”97 The act defines “totally enclosed manner” 
as meaning “any manner which will ensure that any exposure 
of human beings or the environment to a polychlorinated 
biphenyl will be insignificant as determined by the 
Administrator by rule.”98 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 365. 
91. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (2012). 
92. Id. § 2604 (2012). 
93. Id. § 2603 (2012). 
94. See id. § 2605(e) (PCBs), (f) (mercury); 15 U.S.C. § 2643 (asbestos); 15 U.S.C. § 
2670 (radon); 15 U.S.C. § 2687 (lead); 15 U.S.C. § 2697 (formaldehyde). 
95. Id. § 2605(e), (f) (2012). 
96. Id. § 2605(e)(2)(A) (2012). 
97. Id. § 2605(e)(2)(B) (2012). 
98. Id. § 2605(e)(2)(C) (2012). 
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Following the passage of the TSCA, the EPA almost fully 
prohibited PCBs in the U.S.99 The EPA promulgated 
regulations specifically prohibiting the manufacture, sale, 
distribution, and export of items containing PCBs under fifty 
parts per million (ppm) in concentration unless the items were 
manufactured, sold, distributed, or exported in a “totally 
enclosed manner” as required by the Act.100 These items 
include a laundry list of “dielectric fluids; solvents; oils; waste 
oils; heat transfer fluids; hydraulic fluids; paints or coatings; 
sludges; slurries; sediments; dredge spoils; soils; materials 
containing PCBs as a result of spills; and other chemical 
substances or combinations of substances, including impurities 
and byproducts and any byproduct, intermediate, or impurity 
manufactured at any point in a process.”101 Certain items 
containing PCBs over fifty ppm are prohibited under the 
regulation, based on their impact to human health and the 
environment.102 The regulations specifically provide that 
“totally enclosed” items include “intact, nonleaking electrical 
equipment.”103 The EPA’s regulations make it clear that a 
failure to comply could lead to civil and criminal penalties.104 
Subsection D of the regulations covers the storage and 
disposal of PCB items. This section requires that PCB 
liquids105, PCB articles106, and PCB containers107 all meet 
specific storage and disposal requirements. Liquids with 
concentrations greater than 500 ppm must be disposed of in an 
incinerator.108 Conversely liquids with concentrations between 
fifty ppm and 500 ppm can be disposed of in a high efficiency 
boiler109, or in the case of incidental source liquids in a 
chemical landfill.110 Materials containing PCBs must generally 
99. 40 C.F.R. § 761.20(a) (2012). 
100. Id. § 761.20(a) (2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (e)(2)(C). 
101. 40 C.F.R. § 761.1(b)(1) (2013). 
102. Id. § 761.20. 
103. Id. 
104. Trost, supra note 39, at 120.  
105. 40 C.F.R. § 761.60(a) (2013). 
106. Id. § 761.60(b). 
107. Id. § 761.60(c). 
108. Id. § 761.60(a)(1), (2). 
109. For boiler requirements see Id. § 761.71(a), (b). 
110. Id. § 761.60(a)(3) (2012). For regulations on chemical landfill requirements see 
40 C.F.R. § 761.75 (2012). 
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be disposed of in an incinerator111 or chemical landfill112 except 
for specific items such as natural gas pipelines that may be 
“abandoned” or removed to regulated solid waste disposal 
facilities.113 However, under Subsection (e), the EPA can 
authorize alternative disposal methods after a written request 
is submitted with evidence that the method of disposal will not 
“present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment.”114 Based on the detailed regulations 
promulgated by the EPA, as well as the language in the TSCA, 
it is clear that the TSCA specifically regulates PCBs and PCB 
disposal. Therefore, there is a strong argument that the TSCA 
does specifically apply to SINKEX, as the ships contain levels 
of PCBs defined as dangerous to human health and the 
environment by the EPA.115 
If the EPA either denies a permit or fails to respond, the 
TSCA allows for citizen petitions and enforcement unless the 
EPA has a current regulation or permit on a particular 
substance.116 The citizen suit provision regarding rulemaking 
in the TSCA is somewhat unique in that it requires a de novo 
standard of review by the court.117 The de novo standard 
precludes the traditional deference given agencies under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), leaving the court more 
freedom to interpret the application of the statute.118 In doing 
so, it also cuts petitioners off from utilizing both the de novo 
standard and an APA standard.119 Thus, the decision of the 
court would rest on the language of the TSCA, and the 
arguments put forth by the parties without deference to EPA 
111. 40 C.F.R. § 761.60(b) (2013). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. § 761.60(b)(5)(i) and (ii). 
114. Id. § 761.60(e). 
115. For PCB levels on the Navy ships see EX-AGERHOLM CASE STUDY, supra note 
19, at 2-10-2-11. For allowed levels by the EPA see 40 C.F.R. § 229.2 (2012). 
116. 15 U.S.C. § 2620(a) (2012). 
117. Id. § 2620(b)(4)(B); Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Thomas, 704 F. Supp 149 (N.D. 
Illinois, 1989) (scrutinizing the EPA’s denial of a petition under a de novo standard of 
review). Compare with the silence in other pollution control acts including the CAA, 42 
U.S.C. § 7604 (2012), the CWA, 33 U. S. C § 1365 (2012), and RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 
(2012). 
118. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Reilly, 909 F.2d 1497, 1505 (D.C. circuit, 1990) (applying 
both APA and de novo standards of review would be judicially inconsistent). 
119. Id. 
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interpretations of the TSCA.120 
Compared with the Ocean Dumping Act, the TSCA has 
stricter regulations regarding the disposal of toxic waste in 
connection with specific chemicals. But unlike the Ocean 
Dumping Act it did not fully preempt all state and common 
law claims, leaving potentially stricter regulations in place.121 
C. National Defense Exemptions in Both the TSCA and 
Ocean Dumping Act Allow for a Military Escape Hatch 
The TSCA contains an express military defense waiver,122 
while the Ocean Dumping Act provides that the President may 
exempt any federal facility from state dumping laws if “it is in 
the paramount interest of the United States to do so.”123 
Defense waivers are present in most environmental statutes, 
providing a built-in escape hatch for the military.124 However, 
these waivers have rarely been invoked by any military branch 
domestically, suggesting that they were designed for specific 
unavoidable moments such as war on U.S. soil, or for 
international military actions.125 
120. Id.; Thomas, 704 F. Supp at 152. 
121. 15 U.S.C. § 2617 (2012); Edward A. Nolfi, State or Local Regulation of Toxic 
Substances as pre-empted by Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C.A. §2601, et seq.), 
84 A.L.R. FED. 913 (Originally published in 1987). 
122. 15 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012). 
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1416(d)(3) (2012). 
124. See express waivers in Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (2012); Clean 
Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (2012) (new sources), 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (2012) (toxic 
pollutants); Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300(h)-7(h) (2012); 
Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (2012). See partial waivers in 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. § 1371(5)(A)(i) and (ii) (2012); 
Costal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) (2012). For a 
discussion on various defense waivers including how the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) is functionally waived see Kristen D. Wheeler, Homeland Security 
and Environmental Regulation: Balancing Long-Term Environmental Goals with 
Immediate Security Needs, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 437, 452 (2006); Hope Babcock, National 
Security and Environmental Laws: A Clear and Present Danger?, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
105, 110-120 (2007).  
125. For a discussion of the perceived narrowness of the waivers by the military and 
lack of use see Babcock, supra note 124, at 117-120. For a discussion of the 
Department of Defense’s use of exemptions under hazardous waste laws see Caitlin 
Sislin, Comment, Exempting Department of Defense from Federal Hazardous Waste 
Laws: Resource Contamination as “Range Preservation”?, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 647, 666-
667 (2005). See also Dycus, supra note 18, at 149 (waivers have never been used 
during a war); Alexander Gillespie, The Limits of International Environmental Law: 
Military Necessity v. Conservation, 23 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 29-30 (2012) 
(domestic waivers use internationally).  
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The TSCA’s military waiver is express and clear. The 
language states in unequivocal terms that the EPA “shall 
waive compliance with any provision of this chapter upon a 
request and determination by the President that the requested 
waiver is necessary in the interest of national defense.”126 If 
the EPA is asked to grant such a waiver and does so, it is 
required to publish a notice in the Federal Register that the 
waiver was granted for national defense purposes.127 In 
addition, the EPA must provide its reasoning for issuing the 
waiver in the event of a judicial proceeding requesting in 
camera review.128 
The Ocean Dumping Act does not have an express national 
defense waiver. Instead, it has an exemption from state 
dumping laws for federal facilities when the President 
determines the exemption to be in the best interest of the 
U.S.129 The exemption is much narrower than the broad 
exemption under the TSCA and in some ways more practical 
for military use.130 For instance the TSCA waiver seems, by 
both its language and lack of use, to be focused on waiver for 
emergency defense situations, such as an attack on U.S. soil.131 
The Ocean Dumping Act exemption, by contrast, seems to be 
more focused on routine issues, such as when military bases do 
not want to have to comply with permitting regimes.132 
The presence of a defense waiver in the TSCA and the 
exemption in the Ocean Dumping Act show Congressional 
awareness of the potential conflict between environmental 
laws and concerns about national defense.133 The military, 
though not always in conflict with environmental statutes, is a 
major source of pollution in the U.S.134 The military also has a 
trump card that many other private and governmental actors 
126. 15 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1416(d)(3) (2012). 
130. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (refusing to enjoin the 
Navy’s bombing a common fishing grounds off the coast of Puerto Rico under Clean 
Water Act, which has a similar waiver to the Ocean Dumping Act, and instead stating 
that a waiver would promote eventual compliance). 
131. See Dycus, supra note 18, at 149; Babcock, supra note 124, at 117-120. 
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1416(d)(3) (2012); compare with the CWA waiver, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 
(2012). 
133. Babcock, supra note 124, at 110. 
134. Dycus, supra note 18, at 4. 
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do not have—national defense.135 While other agencies can 
argue their actions are for the public good, the military’s 
ability to argue an action is necessary for national defense 
draws on a deeper issue of safety and concern for our nation’s 
existence.136 Thus, including such exemptions in 
environmental statutes, especially in the TSCA and Ocean 
Dumping Act, is one example of congressional inclination to 
give national defense more weight than environmental safety 
and public health.137 
D. SINKEX Should Not Be Exempted Under a National 
Defense Waiver 
The Navy SINKEX program does not appear to fall directly 
under the national defense exceptions found in the TSCA or 
the Ocean Dumping Act. The SINKEX program is a training 
and disposal program.138 Although the Navy may argue it is 
vital to national security to train sailors using live firing drills, 
no military branch has successfully invoked the waiver on this 
basis.139 Based on the argument that the TSCA waiver was 
intended by Congress to be used in national defense 
emergencies, SINKEX as a training exercise would not 
qualify.140 Indeed the President has a strong incentive to not 
135. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 12 (2008); Caroline Milne, 
Winter v. National Resources Defense Council: The United States Supreme Court Tips 
the Balance against Environmental Interests in the Name of National Security, 23 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 187, 189 (2009); Joel R. Reynolds, Taryn G. Kiekow, Stephen Zak Smith, 
No Whale of a Tale: Legal Implications of Winter v. NRDC, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 753, 755 
(2009). 
136. “[E]ven if plaintiffs have shown irreparable injury from the Navy's training 
exercises, any such injury is outweighed by the public interest and the Navy's interest 
in effective, realistic training of its sailors.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 23. 
137. “Obviously, the nation’s very existence should not be imperiled by a wooden 
adherence to formal rules and procedures for environmental protection. Yet any 
variance should be carefully tailored to the emergency, promptly publicized . . . and 
documented to ensure agency accountability and enable judicial review.” Dycus, supra 
note 18, at 152. 
138. SEA 21, supra note 3. 
139. See Babcock, supra note 124, at 117-120; Sislin, supra note 125, at 666-667; 
Dycus, supra note 18, at 149. 
140. Courts have applied these waivers strictly, reading them narrowly. See 
Babcock, supra note 124, at 118 (citing Colonel E.G. Willard, Lieutenant Colonel Tom 
Zimmerman, Lieutenant Colonel Eric Bee, Environmental Law and National Security: 
Can Existing Exemptions in Environmental Laws Preserve DOD Training and 
Operational Prerogatives without New Legislation?, 54 A.F. L. REV. 65, 70). The 
Military may also be hesitant to invoke them as they may require disclosure of 
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waive the TSCA for the SINKEX program. For instance, 
waiving the TSCA’s environmental protections could set a 
precedent used for a wide variety of other military training 
programs that could potentially cause public outrage.141 One 
program may go unnoticed by the general public, especially 
when it occurs in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. However, if 
other military training exercises conducted by the Army, Air 
Force, Coast Guard, or Marines seek an exemption, the public 
will notice serious problems affecting environmental and 
human health.142 SINKEX would also not qualify under the 
exemption to the Ocean Dumping Act as it is a training 
program and not a federal facility.143 Additionally, SINKEX 
does not occur within state territorial waters, making state law 
inapplicable and the waiver unneeded.144 
III. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND LIMITS ON 
ENFORCEMENT 
In order to more strictly regulate SINKEX the Navy must 
cooperate with the EPA and comply with the permit. If not, the 
EPA must have a mechanism to enforce the permit. The EPA’s 
permitting of the Navy SINKEX program under either the 
Ocean Dumping Act or the TSCA raises questions about the 
ability of agencies to issue permits to one another and the 
court system’s ability to review such action. 
information. See 15 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012) (requiring EPA publication of the reason for 
granting the waiver). 
141. Compare to nuclear weapons testing in Nevada and the worry about health 
risks, specifically cancer, in the surrounding areas. See Steven Simon, André Bouville, 
Charles Land, Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests and Cancer Risks, AMERICAN 
SCIENTIST, Vol. 94, number 1, 48 (2006), available at 
http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/feature/2006/1/fallout-from-nuclear-weapons-
tests-and-cancer-risks/1; Ralph Vartabedian, State Seeks Compensation for Nevada 
Test Site Contamination, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2011) available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/09/nation/la-na-0610-radioactive-water-20110610. 
142. Id. 
143. 33 U.S.C. § 1416(d)(3) (2012); SEA 21, supra note 3. 
144. State territorial waters reach three geographical miles offshore. 43 U.S.C. § 
1312 (2012). SINKEX sinkings typically occur much further from shore, such as the 
ex-AGERHOLM, which was sunk 120 miles from the coast of California. EX-
AGERHOLM CASE STUDY, supra note 19, at 1-1. 
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A. The EPA is Constrained from Issuing a Stricter Permit 
Because of Political Pressures 
The EPA issues permits to the Navy for SINKEX under the 
Ocean Dumping Act, yet it could also do so under the TSCA.145 
The TSCA allows for EPA discretion to choose the regulating 
statute if the EPA is adequately regulating and controlling the 
risk under another statute.146 In choosing whether to regulate 
SINKEX under the Ocean Dumping Act or the TSCA the EPA 
may consider a variety of factors, but one factor that seems to 
play a prominent role is the Navy’s willingness to cooperate.147 
Regulating the Navy under the Ocean Dumping Act gives the 
EPA flexibility to work with the Navy to create a general 
permit that satisfies the goals of both agencies.148 
Political pressure by the executive is a large influence on the 
EPAs permitting of the Navy due to their status as executive 
agencies.149 However, if a court mandate required the EPA to 
enforce a stricter permit against the Navy, Navy compliance 
with a stricter permit would be a major hurdle for the EPA to 
overcome. Two methods besides political routes could be used 
to obtain Navy compliance with a stricter permit. The first is 
the EPA could sue the Navy. But there is a real question of 
whether it is even constitutional for the EPA to do so.150 
Separation of powers issues under the “unitary executive 
theory,”151 as well as questions as to whether such a suit would 
constitute a true “case or controversy” under Article Three 
make the viability of litigation uncertain.152 The “unitary 
145. Complaint at 5-7, Basel Action Network v. EPA, No. CV 11 6185 (N.D.Cal. 
December 8, 2011), 2011 WL 6401178. 
146. 15 U.S.C. § 2608(b) (2012). 
147. Jones Letter, supra note 8; Wayland Letter, supra note 1. 
148. See Jones Letter, supra note 8; Wayland Letter, supra note 1. 
149. 42 U.S.C. § 4321(1)(b) (2012); U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
150. The EPA has never sued another agency for compliance. For a discussion of why 
see Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Federal Agencies?, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
317, 320-21 (1990). (Arguing that there is no constitutional bar to inter-agency suits). 
151. “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. For a detailed overview of the “unitary 
executive theory” and its constitutional basis see Steven G. Calabresi, Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541 (1994-1995). 
152. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . to Controversies . . . .” U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; S. Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold 
Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300, 301 (1892) (parties are not adverse if under the control of 
the same person or corporation). 
21
Zippel: A Sinking Ship: EPA Regulation of the Navy Training Program SINKE
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2013
288 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 3:2 
executive theory” argues that the President has sole control 
over agency actions, making judicial enforcement or 
intervention a separation of powers concern.153 Article Three 
jurisdiction is also uncertain because of the nature of agencies 
as part of the executive branch. It is unclear whether a suit by 
one federal agency, such as the EPA, against another, such as 
the Navy, could constitute a true “case or controversy” as they 
are both ultimately accountable to the President.154 
The “unitary executive theory” is based in the constitutional 
doctrine of separation of powers.155 It finds its roots in the 
Constitution: “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States.”156 As Justice Scalia explains, 
the Constitution “does not mean some of the executive power, 
but all of the executive power.”157 According to the “unitary 
executive theory” any dispute between the Navy and the EPA, 
both of which are ultimately under the control of the President, 
should be resolved within the executive branch without the 
involvement of the judiciary.158 
The “unitary executive theory” illustrates the difficulties the 
EPA would face filing a suit against the Navy to enforce a 
stricter permit. Courts are reluctant to interfere in what they 
see as policy choices within an agency so long as the agency is 
acting in compliance with the law.159 In this case, if the EPA 
153. “And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite 
allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas 
committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of art 
employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the 
case-and-controversy doctrine.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). See also 
Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (The main 
questions to address are (1) is the power purely executive, and (2) is another branch 
depriving the President of that power?).  
154. See S. Spring Hill Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. at 301 (parties are not adverse if 
under the control of the same person or corporation); Steinberg, supra note 150 
(arguing that there is no constitutional bar to inter-agency suits). 
155. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the vesting clauses for 
each of the three branches of the government limits and separates different powers 
which should not be encroached on by other branches). 
156. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. See also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 151, at 
559. 
157. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 704. 
158. “Federal judicial power is limited to those disputes which confine federal courts 
to a rule consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally 
thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Flast, 392 U.S. at 97.  
159. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (giving discretion 
to agencies to interpret statutes so long as the interpretation is reasonable in the face 
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did sue the Navy to force compliance with a stricter permit, the 
court most likely would hesitate to look too closely at what, on 
the surface, seems an inter-agency, inner executive branch 
dispute.160 Although courts may hesitate to resolve these 
disputes, there is a possibility they would force compliance if 
the court determined the law demanded it.161 If the Navy did 
not comply with an EPA permit requirement required by 
statute, the Navy would be acting “not in accordance with 
law,”162 an action that is judicially reviewable under the 
APA.163 Therefore, the court could potentially hear the merits 
of the case so long as it fulfills other jurisdictional 
requirements. 
Interwoven with concerns stemming from separation of 
powers infringement by the courts are Constitutional 
jurisdictional limits on federal courts.164 If the EPA sued the 
Navy the executive branch would be on both sides of the 
dispute. Article Three of the U.S. Constitution precludes suits 
where the same person or power controls the adverse 
parties.165 Here, the interests of the EPA would be enforcing 
compliance with its permit issued under the Ocean Dumping 
Act or TSCA to fulfill its statutory duties.166 The Navy’s 
interests would be the training of their sailors for national 
security and defense.167 It could be argued that those interests, 
both for the public good, are different enough from each other 
to provide a real “case or controversy,” overcoming this 
of ambiguous statutory language). 
160. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 96. 
161. U.S. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949) (even though 
the case involved the United States on both sides it still was a “justiciable 
controversy”). 
162. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2012). 
163. “The reviewing court shall . . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be— (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” id.; “‘agency action’ includes the 
whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or 
denial thereof, or failure to act[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012). 
164. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
165. See S. Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 
U.S. 300, 301 (1892) (parties are not adverse if under the control of the same person or 
corporation); See also Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 66 U.S. 419, 425 (1861) (parties not 
adverse when the interests on both sides rested in the same person). 
166. See 33 U.S.C. § 1411 (2011); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2012). 
167. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 25 (2008) (the Navy’s 
interest in training exercises is national security). 
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jurisdictional hurdle.168 However, the EPA may also be 
restricted from suing the Navy due to political and policy 
reasons. 
Executive pressure is one example of such a political and 
policy reason. Under the U.S. Constitution it is the duty of the 
President to make sure the “Laws be faithfully executed.”169 
Included within that duty is control over the regulatory 
framework and political accountability for agency action.170 
With political accountability comes a reason and desire to more 
closely control agency decisions based on political and policy 
choices. Interagency disputes involving legal matters are 
required to go through the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), 
which is part of the Department of Justice (DOJ).171 The 
executive branch requests agencies to resolve disputes within 
the branch instead of solving problems within the court 
system.172 The President could order the EPA not to pressure 
the Navy into a stricter permit so long as the permit complies 
with the relevant statutes.173 
B. Executive Branch Limits Enforcement of Environmental 
Permits on the Military 
The political will to impose environmental restrictions on 
the department of defense shifts from administration to 
administration. During the Clinton and Obama 
Administrations there were some markers to suggest that the 
168. See U.S. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949) (even 
though the case involved the United States on both sides it still was a “justiciable 
controversy”). 
169. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. 
170. Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1173-1174 (2011-2012). 
171. “Whenever two or more Executive agencies whose heads serve at the pleasure 
of the President are unable to resolve such a legal dispute, the agencies shall submit 
the dispute to the Attorney General prior to proceeding in any court, except where 
there is specific statutory vesting of responsibility for a resolution elsewhere.” Exec. 
Order No. 12,146 Management of Federal Legal Resources, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,657, §1-
402 (July 18, 1979). The Attorney General delegated this authority to the Office of 
Legal Counsel, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL 
COUNSEL, http://www.justice.gov/olc/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). 
172. Id. at § 1-401. 
173. For an example of the President ordering the EPA not to apply stricter 
standards see Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Office of Management and Budget, to Lisa 
Jackson, EPA Administrator (Sept. 2, 2011) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/ozone_national_ambient_air_quality_standards_letter.pdf. 
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EPA’s best method to enforce a stricter permit would be 
through the executive branch.174 Some indications of support 
were based on executive orders pushing for federal agencies to 
cooperate with environmental mandates.175 
Using executive orders to encourage agency compliance with 
environmental statutes and permits began in 1978, when 
President Jimmy Carter signed executive order 12,088.176 It 
stated: “[e]ach Executive agency shall cooperate with the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency . . . and 
State, interstate, and local agencies in the prevention, control, 
and abatement of environmental pollution.”177 Executive Order 
12,088 suggested that an EPA determination would be backed 
by the President, and that other agencies would be expected to 
comply.178 However, Executive Order 12,088 contained several 
exemptions comparable to the waivers in the TSCA and Ocean 
Dumping Act.179 For example, § 1-701 provided that the 
President might exempt agencies from complying with the 
TSCA “in the interest of national security.”180 Furthermore, 
the executive order required conflicts between the EPA and 
other executive agencies over pollution statutes be resolved 
within the executive branch either through compromise 
between the agencies or by asking the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget to intervene.181 Executive Order 
12,088 was revoked by Executive Order 13,148182 in 2000 
under President Clinton, which was later revoked in 2007 by 
Executive Order 13,423 signed by President Bush.183 Executive 
174. See Exec. Order No. 13,148 Greening the Government Through Leadership in 
Environmental Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,595 (April 21, 2000). See also early 
examples of Obama’s interest in promoting environmental issues such as climate 
change, John M. Broder, Obama Team Set on Environment, N.Y. TIMES, December 10, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/us/politics/11appoint.html. 
175. See Exec. Order No. 13,148 Greening the Government Through Leadership in 
Environmental Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,595 (April 21, 2000). 
176. Exec. Order No. 12,088 Federal Compliance With Pollution Control Standards, 
43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (Oct. 13, 1978). 
177. Id. at § 1-202. 
178. Id. at §1-1. 
179. Id. at §§ 1-701, 1-602. 
180. Id. at § 1-701. 
181. Id. at § 1-602. 
182. Exec. Order No. 13,148 Greening the Government Through Leadership in 
Environmental Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,595 (April 21, 2000). 
183. Exec. Order No. 13,423 Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and 
Transportation Management, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 (Jan. 24, 2007). 
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Order 13,423 still stands today under President Obama.184 
The new language in Executive Order 13,148 built upon and 
strengthened the language in Executive Order 12,088 by 
requiring agencies to comply with environmental 
regulations.185 It also included two specific provisions 
regarding toxic chemicals, requiring reporting on release of 
toxic chemicals and reduction of use as well as specific 
instructions on compliance assurance.186 The national security 
exemption was also kept, and expanded to allow exemptions 
based on lack of funds appropriated by Congress, so long as the 
agency showed it asked for the funds in its budget.187 It also 
provided a backdoor for agency non-compliance, stating that 
“OMB . . . may modify the compliance requirements for an 
agency under this order, if the agency is unable to 
comply . . . .”188 
President Bush changed the language in Executive Order 
13,423 to a general policy statement.189 Instead of requiring all 
executive agencies to comply with environmental regulations, 
the order states that all federal agencies must “conduct their 
environmental, transportation, and energy-related activities 
under the law in support of their respective missions in an 
environmentally, economically and fiscally sound, integrated, 
continuously improving, efficient, and sustainable manner.”190 
This broad language takes away the requirement to comply 
with EPA regulation and instead presents a policy based on 
fulfilling amorphous environmental goals. While noble, the 
language takes support away from EPA regulations and places 
it in a discretionary policy zone to be determined by the 
184. Id. 
185. “Each agency shall comply with environmental regulations by establishing and 
implementing environmental compliance audit programs and policies that emphasize 
pollution prevention as a means to both achieve and maintain environmental 
compliance.” Exec. Order No. 13,148 Greening the Government Through Leadership in 
Environmental Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,595, § 202 (April 21, 2000).  
186. Id. at § 204-05, § 406. 
187. Id. at § 801.  
188. Id. at § 802. 
189. “It is the policy of the United States that Federal agencies conduct their 
environmental, transportation, and energy-related activities under the law in support 
of their respective missions in an environmentally, economically and fiscally sound, 
integrated, continuously improving, efficient, and sustainable manner.” Exec. Order 
No. 13,423 Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation 
Management, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 § 1 (Jan. 24, 2007). 
190. Id. 
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agencies whose activities are regulated by the EPA. However, 
unlike in the previous two executive orders, there is no broad 
exemption for national defense. The closest Executive Order 
13,423 comes to an exemption for national defense is one for 
intelligence operations when compliance would force 
unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources.191 The lack of 
compliance enforcement may undercut the need for a national 
defense exemption. The current order suggests that the EPA 
might have difficulties forcing the Navy to comply with a 
stricter permit without additional support from the president. 
C. Judicial Enforcement in Citizen Suits is Possible 
The second way a stricter EPA permit under the TSCA could 
be enforced is through citizen suits. Citizen suits have become 
an important method of forcing federal compliance with 
environmental statutes.192 In 2008, the Supreme Court set out 
a balancing test between the public good of environmental 
health and national defense in Winter v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council.193 Winter arose out of Navy sonar training 
exercises off the coast of California. The training exercises 
used mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar, which research in 
other areas linked to adverse effects on marine mammals 
including behavioral disruptions, hearing disruptions, and 
mass strandings.194 The area off the California coast in 
question in Winter contained at least thirty-seven species of 
marine mammals including nine protected under the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA).195 There was some dispute of 
the facts, but the Navy claimed no mammals had been injured 
in the training exercises, which had been taking place for over 
forty years.196 The plaintiffs indicated the injuries might have 
occurred as outlined above.197 Although not involving the 
TSCA, Winter resolved the dispute in favor of national 
191. Id. at § 8(a). 
192. For a discussion of the importance of citizen suits in environmental law see 
Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, 
Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81 (2002). 
193. 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
194. Id. at 13. See also Milne, supra note 135, at 187; Reynolds, Kiekow, Smith, 
supra note 135, at 756.  
195. 555 U.S. at 14; Milne, supra note 135, at 187. 
196. Winter, 555 U.S. at 14. 
197. Id. 
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defense.198 Any case attempting to force compliance or to stop 
SINKEX through an injunction until the ships were further 
stripped of PCBs would have to show that the environmental 
and human health concerns resulting from SINKEX were 
greater than the military benefit of the live fire training.199 
IV. CONCLUSION: BALANCING THE PUBLIC GOOD OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND HUMAN HEALTH 
WITH THE PUBLIC GOOD OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 
Although a case forcing stricter permitting by the EPA 
would not directly involve the Navy as a party, looking at the 
policies and arguments behind the tension between 
environmental concerns and national defense concerns is 
essential. Both the Navy and the EPA are required by law to 
act according to their enabling and governing statutes.200 
SINKEX is an example of badly aligned agency mandates and 
unresolved tensions in government purposes. Any 
consideration of EPA permitting of the Navy will have to take 
into account the reasons behind having a more lenient or 
stricter permit because of that tension. Even given the tension, 
the EPA cannot choose to ignore the TSCA’s requirements 
because it is difficult for them politically and legally to do so.201 
SINKEX is not the first example of military training 
programs causing tension between environmental laws and 
military goals of national defense nor will it be the last.202 
Furthermore, it should not be left to citizen suits to force 
compliance with environmental statutes when the situation 
becomes politically uncomfortable for the EPA and executive 
branch. A fundamental change needs to take place between all 
three branches of the government acknowledging both are 
necessary for a successful nation. 
Legislative reform should be the driving force for the 
change. As this paper examined, the executive branch is bound 
to the conflicting mandates in the legislation passed by 
Congress. One way to resolve this conflict might be as simple 
as “throwing money at it.” Although cliché, the Navy seems 
198. Id. at 20. See also Milne, supra note 135. 
199. Winter, 555 U.S. at 33. 
200. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012). 
201. Id. 
202. See Winter, 555 U.S. 7; Willard, Zimmerman, Bee, supra note 140. 
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open to proper disposal of ships so long as the budget for such 
an expensive endeavor is provided.203 Although SINKEX does 
provide some training opportunities, the Navy was willing in 
the past to suspend it when environmental concerns were first 
noted.204 If Congress allocated funds for the disposal of ships 
instead of just the building and design of new ships the Navy 
would have an alternative to either sinking the ships in the 
ocean or letting them sit in inner harbors leaking toxins into 
waters close to shore. 
Additionally, disposal of ships should be considered in new 
ship designs. Designing new ships to reduce toxic waste or 
allow for disposal techniques that would reduce contamination 
in our marine environment would prevent similar situations 
from arising in the future. If disposal was considered every 
time a new ship was built it would have a large impact on how 
ships are designed, what materials they are made of, and how 
easy it is to remove hazardous and toxic waste before disposal 
whether that be by a ship breaker or by a program like 
SINKEX. 
Finally, although there is no clear solution to the tensions 
between environmental safety, public health, and national 
defense they do not have to be mutually exclusive. Crafting 
future legislation and policies to address those tensions will 
make it easier for agencies like the EPA and the Navy to work 
together in the future to satisfy both mandates. 
203. See SEA 21, supra note 3; SINKEX DISPOSAL supra note 16; EX-AGERHOLM 
CASE STUDY, supra note 19, at 1-1. 
204. Id. 
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